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SHOULD CLAUSES PROHIBITING 
ASSIGNMENT BE OVERRIDDEN BY 
STATUTE? 
Louise Gullifer* 
Many contracts for the supply of goods or services include a 
clause prohibiting assignment by the supplier of its rights under the 
contract. The existence of such clauses, both in particular contracts 
and more generally, can have a chilling effect on the use of receivables 
as collateral to obtain financing. Thus, there is a legislative override for 
such clauses so that they are not enforceable against third parties. 
There has been an ongoing debate as to whether the law of England 
and Wales should follow suit and, if so, what form the override should 
take. While the debate continues among academics and practitioners, 
the Government has enacted a power to make reforms in the Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015.1 This paper examines 
the arguments for and against an override in English law, informed by 
two small-scale surveys undertaken by the author and others over the 
last four years.2 The detailed form of an override will not be discussed 
                                                 
*   Professor of Commercial Law, University of Oxford; Fellow and Tutor 
in Law, Harris Manchester College, Oxford. 
1   The Department of Business, Innovation and Skills has consulted on 
draft Regulations and further work is continuing, of which the author is a part. See 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Invoice finance: nullifying the ban 
on invoice assignment contract clauses,  
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/invoice-finance-nullifying-the-
ban-on-invoice-assignment-contract-clauses (2015); see also Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act, 2015, c. 26 (U.K.). 
2   One of the surveys was carried out by Hugh Beale and Louise Gullifer 
in 2011 (“2011 Study”) with the assistance of Anna Kloeden. The survey was funded 
by the Asset Based Finance Association (ABFA), which stressed from the outset that 
it wanted a completely independent view. The second survey was carried out in 2014 
as part of the work of the Secured Transactions Law Reform Project (“2014 Study”) 
by Sarah Paterson. I am grateful to both Hugh Beale and Sarah Paterson for 
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for reasons of space. The model that is likely to be adopted in England 
and Wales is that found in the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9, 
which provides that an anti-assignment clause is generally ineffective.3   
I.  THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST AN OVERRIDE 
In order to maximize the availability of finance and credit in 
the economy, it is important that as many sources of wealth as possible 
can be used as collateral. To do this, the source of wealth (the asset) 
must be able to be alienated to the secured creditor. The obvious assets 
which could be alienated are tangible assets: goods and land. However, 
sources of wealth also include intangible assets, most importantly, 
rights to be paid by another. Thus, many centuries ago, it became 
possible to use obligations owed to a borrower as collateral for a loan, 
first by pledging a document which represented that obligation (a 
documentary intangible), and then by enabling the benefit of 
obligations to be assigned, either absolutely or by way of security. A 
major difference between the use of tangible property as collateral, and 
the use of such obligations, known in English law as choses or things 
in action,4 is that in the latter case there is another person to consider, 
namely the obligor. There is no real problem when the obligor takes 
on an obligation that is designed to be transferred, for example, a 
negotiable instrument. But, where the obligation can be transferred 
without the agreement, or even the knowledge, of the obligor, a policy 
imperative arises in competition to that of maximizing available 
collateral by permitting alienability: that of protection, where 
necessary, of the obligor. This policy can be seen in English law, for 
example, by the rule that only an assignee who has taken a statutory 
assignment can sue the debtor.5 If an equitable assignment is taken, the 
assignor must be joined in any action. There are three main criteria for 
a statutory assignment: (1) the assignment must be in writing; (2) the 
assignment must not relate to part of a debt or a future debt; and (3) 
                                                 
permitting me to use the results of the surveys in this paper, and for many useful 
discussions. 
   3 U.C.C. § 9-406(d) (2015).  
4   Also known as intangibles; however, the category of intangibles is 
potentially wider than just choses in action, e.g., intellectual property and carbon 
trading units. 
5   Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 136 (Eng.).  
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notice of the assignment must be given to the debtor. All serve some 
function in protecting the debtor. Additionally, the policy of protecting 
the obligor can be seen by the rule that the benefit of a contract for 
personal services cannot be assigned,6 and more generally, by the fact 
that an obligor is permitted to protect himself by restricting the ability 
of the obligee to assign the benefits of the obligation to another. This 
permission, though, is justified by the even more fundamental policy 
of protection of freedom of contract. 
Thus, whether there should be a statutory override of anti-
assignment clauses can be seen as a matter of balancing competing 
policy imperatives: alienability of assets, which maximizes available 
collateral, and freedom of contract, which allows obligors to protect 
themselves against adverse effects of assignment of the right to which 
their obligation correlates. On that basis, many jurisdictions and 
transnational instruments favor alienability.7 Gilmore described the 
view in favor of the unrestricted and unrestrictable alienability of 
contract rights as “so fundamental an order [that] belief is instinctive 
and irrational, not logical and reasoned.”8 This argument has been used 
to justify a statutory provision making an anti-assignment clause 
unenforceable against third parties. 
I would like to suggest that the policy position is not so simple. 
At least from the English law perspective, there is a view that the policy 
imperatives can be satisfied without any statutory interference and that 
legislative change has to be justified both by economic arguments 
(based on the effects of uncertainty of outcome), and by evidence that 
the availability and cost of borrowing is actually affected by the 
                                                 
6   Tolhurst v. Assoc. Portland Cement Mfrs. (1900) Ltd., [1903] A.C. 414 
(H.L.). 
7   See ANTHONY DUGGAN & DAVID BROWN, AUSTRALIAN PERSONAL 
PROPERTY SECURITIES LAW 32 (2012) (relating to Personal Property Securities Act 2009 
(Austl.)); UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, at sec. II 
par. 107, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.12 (2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_Ebook-
Guide_09-04-10English.pdf; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Legal Aspects of 
Receivables Financing, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/397 (Apr. 29, 1994); U.N. Secretariat, 
Receivables Financing: Analytical Commentary on the draft Convention on Assignment of 
Receivables in International Trade, ¶ 100, U.N Doc. A/CN.9/489 (Mar. 13, 2001). 
8   GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 212 
(1965).  
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existence (or potential existence) of anti-assignment clauses in 
contracts giving rise to receivables. This is for several interconnected 
reasons. First, the current law, to a large extent, accommodates the 
protection of the obligor and validity of a proprietary interest of the 
assignee. Second, receivables financiers in England and Wales have 
managed reasonably well by adopting “workarounds” to enable 
themselves to function within the current system. Third, the main 
concern about anti-assignment clauses relates to borrowers who are 
small businesses, and is part of a larger problem of inequality of 
bargaining power. Finally, anti-assignment clauses play an important 
and justifiable role in loan agreements, derivative contracts, and other 
financial transactions. In fact, there is real concern about defining the 
scope of statutory controls so that these benefits are not lost. 
II. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE CURRENT LAW 
In analysing the law, terminology can be confusing.  In this 
analysis, terms are adopted that relate to receivables arising from 
supply contracts, since this is the context in which anti-assignment 
clauses are said to cause most problems.9 The parties to the contract 
giving rise to the receivable are called the “supplier,” (the obligee) and 
the “customer,” (the obligor). The supplier is the client of the 
“financier” to whom it assigns, or attempts to assign, the receivable. 
A financier is concerned about three things in relation to the 
receivables it takes as collateral. First, a financier has a proprietary 
interest in the receivables and their proceeds, which will survive the 
insolvency of the supplier.  Second, a financier has priority over any 
subsequent assignee or other person claiming an interest in the 
receivables.  Third, if the customer does not pay, the financier can 
ensure that the debt is enforced, and it has a proprietary claim to the 
proceeds of that enforcement. 
Under English law, there are two types of assignments. The 
first type of assignment is a statutory assignment under section 136 of 
the Law of Property Act 1925, which takes place when certain 
                                                 
9   Another context, i.e., receivables under loan agreements, is considered 
infra section V. 
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conditions are satisfied.10  The most important condition, for purposes 
of this paper, is that there must be notification to the obligor (the 
customer). This means that the customer will, and indeed must, pay 
the financier rather than the supplier.11 If the customer fails to pay, the 
financier is able to sue the customer directly. In effect, the supplier 
drops out of the picture. A statutory assignment will also give the 
financier a proprietary interest in the receivable in the event of the 
insolvency of the supplier, or if there are competing interests.12 There 
is clear authority that a receivable containing an anti-assignment clause 
cannot be the subject of a statutory assignment13 so that the customer 
can continue to pay the supplier and cannot be sued (at law) by the 
financier. 
The second type of assignment is an equitable assignment. An 
assignment is equitable when one of the conditions for a statutory 
assignment is not fulfilled. For example, a valid equitable assignment 
can occur without notifying the customer. A financier who takes an 
equitable assignment has a proprietary interest in the receivable, which 
survives the insolvency of the supplier, and will also have priority over 
a competing interest, subject to the rules on priority. Until the 
customer is notified, if it pays it will, of course, pay the supplier and 
will get a good discharge by so doing. The supplier will then hold those 
proceeds on trust for the financier.14 Further, valid set-offs may 
                                                 
10   See Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20 (Eng.). 
11   If the customer pays the supplier, it will have to pay the financier as 
well and try to recover the payment made to the supplier. 
12   The priority rules, which depend on those set out in the nineteenth 
century case Dearle v. Hall, (1828) 38 Eng. Rep. 475, are somewhat complex. If a 
receivable is assigned twice, the first assignee to give notice to the debtor will have 
priority, providing that he did not have notice of the other assignment at the time he 
took his own assignment. If the debtor has not been notified at all, the assignment 
that is first in time wins. The position is even more complex if one or both of the 
assignments is a security interest, as security interests are required to be registered, 
and registration can, but does not necessarily, constitute notice.  
13   See Linden Gardens Trust Ltd. v. Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd., [1994] 
1 A.C. 85, 106-09 (H.L.). Of course, the true effect of any contractual provision 
(including an anti-assignment clause) will always depend on its exact wording. Thus, 
the Linden Gardens case, though laying down certain principles, was considering a 
particular form of words.   
14   This trust is often expressly declared, but would arise in any event. See 
G.E. Crane Sales Pty. Ltd. v. Comm’r of Taxation (1971), 126 CLR. 177, 213-14 (Austl.); 
Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Willowbrook Int’l Ltd., [1987] 1 F.T.L.R. 386 (Eng.). 
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continue to arise between the supplier and customer until the customer 
receives notification of the assignment;15 after this, only set-offs arising 
from the contract itself or closely connected claims can arise.16 If the 
customer does not pay, the financier cannot, in theory, sue the 
customer for non-payment without joining the supplier to the action, 
although this rule is less restrictive than it sounds. It is easy to join a 
party to an action since no consent is needed if they are joined as a 
defendant, and the court will not require joinder if there is no good 
reason.17 Also, if the financier wishes to enforce, it will first give notice 
of the assignment to the customer. Doing so will not only require the 
customer to pay the financier rather than the supplier,18 but will also, 
in most cases, convert the equitable assignment into a statutory 
assignment,19 thus enabling the financier to sue the customer direct. Of 
course, where the financing is on a non-notification basis, such as 
invoice discounting, the financier would normally expect the supplier 
to enforce against the non-paying customer. If the financing is with 
recourse, the financier would have contractual rights against the 
supplier so that the risk of non-payment is on the supplier.20 It is only 
when the supplier either refuses to sue or is insolvent that the financier 
would be concerned to have the right to sue the customer itself. Even 
then, the financier might not need to enforce directly if there is an 
                                                 
15   Roxburghe v. Cox, [1881] 17 L.R. 520 (Ch. D.) (Eng.); Gov’t of Nfld. 
v. Nfld. Ry. Co., [1888] 13 App. Cas. 199 (P.C.); Bus. Computers Ltd. v. Anglo-
African Leasing Ltd., [1977] 1 W.L.R. 578 (Eng.). 
16   Known in English law as “transaction set-off.” 
17   See William Brandt’s Sons & Co. v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd., [1905] 2 
A.C. 454 (Eng.); Sim Swee Joo Shipping Sdn. Bhd. v. Shirlstar Container Transp. 
Ltd., (unreported) 17 Feb. 1994; Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v. Five Star 
General Trading LLC, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 68, 60, [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1344 (Eng.). 
Good reasons include the possibility that the supplier might contest the assignment, 
or that the assignment is only part of the debt, so that unless the supplier is before 
the court, the customer might face more than one action. 
18   Jones v. Farrell, [1857] 1 De G & J 208; Brice v. Bannister, [1878] 3 
Q.B.D. 569; William Brandt’s Sons & Co. v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd., [1905] 2 A.C. 
454 (H.L). 
19   This would not be the case if the conditions for a statutory assignment 
were not fulfilled, for example, if the assignment was for part of a debt. 
20   See HUGH BEALE ET AL., THE LAW OF SECURITY AND TITLE-BASED 
FINANCING (2d ed. 2012). 
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efficient means of enforcing against the customer through the 
insolvency process of the supplier.21 
If the receivable contains an anti-assignment clause, some, but 
not all, of the above analysis changes. The customer, who is discharged 
by paying the supplier before notification of the assignment, is also 
discharged by paying the supplier after notification: it is entitled to 
ignore the notification. Once the debt is paid, though, the supplier will 
hold the proceeds on trust for the financier despite the anti-assignment 
clause. There is little direct authority on this point in English law, but 
there are a number of dicta22 and academic support23 supporting this 
view. In fact, it is extremely common for invoice discounting 
agreements to include an express provision that the proceeds are held 
on trust for the financier, and an anti-assignment clause will not 
prevent such provision being effective.24 It is thought that even if the 
clause purported to prohibit such a declaration, it would be ineffective 
to prevent such a trust arising since the customer has no interest in 
preventing the alienation of the proceeds and such a clause would be 
against public policy.25 However, this point has never been litigated, so 
the position is not entirely clear. 
                                                 
21   See discussion in the rest of this section. 
22   Re Turcan, [1888] 40 Ch. D. 5, 10-11 (supported by Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in Linden Gardens, [1994] 1 A.C. at 106; Barbados Trust Co. Ltd. v. Bank 
of Zambia, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 148, 28, 77 (C.A.) (Eng.). See also Devefi Pty. Ltd. v. 
Mateffy Perl Nagy Pty. Ltd., [1993] 113 ALR. 225, 236 (Austl.); Don King Prods. Inc. 
v. Warren, [2000] 3 W.L.R. 276 (C.A.) (Eng.). 
23   See Bob Allcock, Restrictions on the Assignment of Contractual Rights, 42 
C.L.J. 328, 335–36 (1983); Gregory Tolhurst, Prohibitions on Assignment and Declaration 
of Trust: Barbados Trust v. Bank of Zambia, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 278 (2007); 
Gerard McMeel, The Modern Law of Assignment: Public Policy and Contractual Restrictions 
on Transferability, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 483, 507-08 (2004); MARCUS SMITH, 
THE LAW OF ASSIGNMENT 347 (2007); Peter Zonneveld, The Effectiveness of Contractual 
Restrictions on the Assignment of Contractual Debts, 22 J. INT’L BUS. & F. L. 313 (2007); 
Chee Ho Tham, Notice of Assignment and Discharge by Performance, LLOYD’S MAR. & 
COM. L.Q. 38, 77 (2010); GOODE ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND SECURITY 
3-39 (Louise Gullifer ed., 5th ed. 2013). 
24   Don King Prods. Inc., [2000] 3 W.L.R. 276; MARCUS SMITH & NICO 
LESLIE, THE LAW OF ASSIGNMENT: THE CREATION AND TRANSFER OF CHOSES IN 
ACTION, Part 25.33–25.36 (2nd ed. 2013).   
25   Roy Goode, Inalienable Rights?, 42 MOD. L.R. 553 (1979); Linden 
Gardens, [1994] 1 A.C. at 108 (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 108). The supplier 
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If the customer does not pay, it is clear that the financier 
cannot sue directly, as there can be no statutory assignment. However, 
provided that the agreement between the supplier and financier can be 
said to give rise to a trust of the unpaid receivable (either expressly or 
impliedly),26 it is likely that the financier can sue the customer, joining 
the supplier as defendant to the action under a procedure known as 
the Vandepitte procedure. A beneficiary under a trust of a right can 
bring an action to force the trustee to bring an action to enforce that 
right for its benefit. The Vandepitte procedure merely short-circuits this 
process by enabling the beneficiary to instigate an action, which brings 
all parties before the court. In a case dealing with the purported 
assignment of a syndicated loan containing a restriction on assignment, 
a majority of the Court of Appeal decided that the Vandepitte 
procedure27 was available to the “assignee.”28 However, other judges 
have expressed doubt as to the appropriateness of the Vandepitte 
procedure in this context.29 
Further, if there is an effective trust of the receivable, the 
financier will have a proprietary interest which survives the supplier’s 
insolvency, and is effective against competing interests in the 
receivable. What is not entirely clear, however, is whether it is possible 
for a well-drafted anti-assignment clause to prevent a trust of the 
receivable from arising. The judges in Barbados Trust were divided on 
                                                 
would be in breach of contract by declaring the trust, but it is hard to see what the 
damages would be. 
26   Whether this is the case depends on the interpretation both of the anti-
assignment clause and the purported assignment. Two recent cases show that this 
interpretation is fact specific, and therefore subject to considerable uncertainty. See 
Co-operative Group Ltd. v. Birse Developments Ltd., [2014] EWHC (TCC) 530 
(Eng.); Stopjoin Projects Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Engineering Services (HY) Ltd., 
[2014] EWHC (TCC) 589. 
27   The Vandepitte procedure is named after the case of Vandepitte v. 
Preferred Accident Insurance Corp. of New York, [1933] A.C. 70 (P.C.) (Eng.). 
Where there is a trust of an obligation, the trustee would usually enforce the 
obligation by suing the obligor.  If the trustee refuses to sue, the beneficiary can sue 
the trustee to force him to do so. The Vandepitte procedure avoids the duplicity of 
actions, by allowing the beneficiary to sue the obligor direct, providing that the 
trustee is joined as defendant. If the action is successful, the court will order payment 
to the trustee, who will then hold those funds on trust for the beneficiary. 
28   Barbados Trust, [2007] EWCA (Civ).  
29   Don King Prods. Inc., [2000] 3 W.L.R. 276 (Lightman J); Barbados 
Trust, [2007] EWCA (Civ) at 139 (Hooper LJ). 
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this issue.30 A strong case can be made for an analysis whereby the trust 
is invalid to the extent that it affects the customer, but is valid as 
between the financier and the supplier.31 However, there is still 
considerable uncertainty as to the correct legal analysis.32 
From the point of view of the customer, the anti-assignment 
clause protects its position by enabling it to get a good discharge by 
paying the supplier: it will never be required to pay anyone else. Even 
if it is sued by the financier under the Vandepitte procedure,33 the order 
will be that the customer pay the supplier (the trustee), who will then 
hold the proceeds on trust for the financier. Further, a notice of 
assignment received by the customer is ineffective to prevent set-offs 
arising between the supplier and the customer.34 
Therefore, the overall legal position is that the interests of the 
financier and the customer can both have a certain degree of 
protection if an anti-assignment clause is used. This position is subject 
to several caveats. First, the law is complex and quite uncertain in some 
areas. There are few cases precisely on the relevant point, and even 
those that there are have generally not arisen in the context of 
receivables financing.35 Second, the legal position will depend on the 
                                                 
30   Barbados Trust, [2007] EWCA (Civ) at 44-47, 88, 129-39.  
31  GOODE ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND SECURITY 3-42 (Louise 
Gullifer ed., 5th ed. 2013). 
32   A contrary view is that the clause renders the receivable inalienable so 
that a valid trust cannot be declared of it. See Andrew McKnight, Contractual 
Restrictions on a Creditor’s Right to Alienate Debts, 18 J. INT’L BANK. L. & REG., no. 2, 
2003, at 43 (2003); Gerard McMeel, The Modern Law of Assignment: Public Policy and 
Contractual Restrictions on Transferability, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 483 (2004); 
Gregory Tolhurst & John Carter, Prohibitions on Assignment: A Choice to Be Made, 73 
C.L.J. 405 (2014); Peter Turner, Charges of Unassignable Rights, 20 J. CONT. L. 97 (2004). 
33   This would only occur if, despite the clause, a valid trust of the 
receivable existed. 
34   If, despite the clause, there is a valid declaration of trust, this will break 
the mutuality required for set-off. If the clause renders a trust invalid to the extent 
that it affects the customer, then the notification of the trust could be said to be 
ineffective for all purposes, including preventing set-offs. See J. Marshall, Declaring a 
Trust Over Rights Under an “Unassignable” Contract, 12 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 1 
(1999).   
35   Linden Gardens, [1994] 1 A.C. 85; Don King Prods. Inc. v. Warren, 
supra note 23; Barbados Trust, [2007] EWCA (Civ) EWHC (TCC) 530. The one 
exception is Stopjoin, [2014] EWHC (TCC) 589.   
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precise wording of the anti-assignment clause and the purported 
assignment or declaration of trust.36  Third, even if a financier is 
protected by the rule that the proceeds are held on trust, this will not 
help if the supplier has not kept the proceeds in an identifiable state so 
that they can be traced on its insolvency. A financier might be better 
off with a proprietary right to a debt owed by a solvent customer, than 
to proceeds that may or may not be held by an insolvent supplier. 
It should be pointed out that the fact that there is a reasonable 
degree of protection in the current law does not necessarily rule out 
statutory intervention. For example, Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.) (1952) article 9-318(4),37 which contained an override of anti-
assignment clauses, was included in the original U.C.C. (1952) to reflect 
existing U.S. law rather than to change it.38   However, this was in the 
context of a codification of commercial law and the introduction of a 
new system for secured financing. To make a case for free-standing 
legislation, a policy imperative is essential. 
III. INDUSTRY WORKAROUNDS 
Until recently, there were two main types of receivables 
financing: factoring, which is on a notification basis, and invoice 
discounting, which is non-notification.39 Factoring tends to be used for 
smaller suppliers, where a financier has concerns about the ability of 
the supplier to run its ledger properly and to operate a trust account, 
and also where the financier has concerns about the supplier’s financial 
position.40 Since factoring involves a statutory assignment, it gives the 
financier much more control over the collection of the debts. 
                                                 
36   Id.  
37   Now revised U.C.C § 9-406(d) (2010). 
38   This is made clear by the official comment to the original U.C.C. Article 
9, which states: “[the provision] can be regarded as a revolutionary departure only by 
those who still cherish the hope that we may yet return to the view entertained some 
two hundred years ago by the Court of the King’s Bench.” However, this is an 
overstatement. There were contrary cases that were overruled by the legislation, such 
as Allhusen v. Caristo Construction Corp., 103 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1952). 
39   Much of the information in this section comes from the 2011 Study, 
updated to take into account recent developments. 
40   Sometimes a financier will shift a client from an invoice discounting 
basis to a factoring basis if the client gets into financial difficulties. 
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Factoring is more expensive for the supplier than invoice discounting, 
and a supplier can pay even more for extra services, such as the taking 
on by the financier of the credit risk of the customer.41 In invoice 
discounting, the collection of the receivables is carried out by the 
supplier, who holds the proceeds in a trust account for the financier. 
Recently, two variations on these structures have become more 
popular, although the details vary in each case. One is discounting of 
individual invoices over an online platform: this takes place on a non-
notification basis, with the platform merely acting as an intermediary. 
Another is supply chain financing whereby a customer arranges with a 
financier that the latter purchases receivables owed by the customer to 
its suppliers at the point when the receivables arise, once the invoice 
has been confirmed by the customer. This has the advantage that there 
is less likely to be disputes about the invoice, and also that it allows the 
financing to be based on the credit rating of the customer rather than 
that of the (smaller) supplier.42 Having said this, this kind of financing 
is usually only offered to established suppliers whose invoices reach a 
certain, reasonably high, level and is also only offered by large 
customers.43 There is also a concern that supply chain financing 
encourages large customers to extend the credit period they require, 
forcing small businesses to pay for a longer period of financing, albeit 
at a lower rate.44 
                                                 
41   Most receivables financing is on a recourse basis whereby the supplier 
either guarantees payment of the receivables or agrees to repurchase unpaid 
receivables. 
42   The U.K. Government launched a scheme in 2012 to encourage 
businesses and government agencies to offer supply chain financing. See Prime 
Minister’s Office, Prime Minister Announces Supply Chain Finance Scheme, GOV.UK 
(Oct. 23, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-
announces-supply-chain-finance-scheme.   
43   2011 Study, supra note 2. 
44   See John Antunes, The Supply Chain Finance Scheme: Hit or Miss?, 
REALBUSINESS (Nov. 8, 2012), http://realbusiness.co.uk/article/15791-the-supply-
chain-finance-scheme-hit-or-miss; James Hurley, Payment Concerns Over Supply-Chain 
Finance Move, TEL. (Oct. 26, 2012 7:00 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/yourbusiness/9634184/Payment-concerns-
over-supply-chain-finance-move.html; Supply Chain Finance Scheme: A Good Idea? 
SELECT FACTORING (2012), http://www.selectfactoring.co.uk/supply-chain-
finance-scheme.  
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Although some of the workarounds discussed below are 
adopted regardless of whether particular receivables arise from 
contracts containing an anti-assignment clause, English financiers very 
frequently check for the presence of anti-assignment clauses (and for 
other problematic clauses) in the invoices they finance.45 Thus, one of 
the major arguments for a statutory override made in other 
jurisdictions (that it is not feasible for a receivables financier to 
discover anti-assignment clauses, causing the whole cost of financing 
to rise)46 is not really made out in England and Wales. However, 
checking contracts is burdensome and takes time, particularly if it is 
necessary to consult lawyers about the effect of a particular clause.47 
The need to do so clearly increases costs, although it is probably the 
case that some checking would still take place even if there were to be 
a statutory override of anti-assignment clauses. It is also the case that 
most supply contracts are on a customer’s standard terms, and 
financiers get to know the terms of large customers and whether they 
contain an anti-assignment clause, so checking involves merely looking 
at who the customers are rather than reading individual contracts. 
If the financing is on a non-notification basis, the presence of 
an anti-assignment clause does not create problems for the financier 
on a day-to-day basis, since the customer does not know of the 
assignment and continues to pay the supplier.48 Of course, the supplier 
would be in breach of contract: this may be of concern if, for example, 
the breach entitled the customer to terminate the supply agreement.49 
                                                 
45   Those interviewed for the 2011 Study all said that they checked for the 
presence of anti-assignment clauses. The picture was more mixed in relation to the 
2014 Study, although most said that they checked at least in many cases. 
46   Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Austl.); ANTHONY DUGGAN & 
DAVID BROWN, supra note 7.  
47   2011 Study, supra note 2. 
48   In the 2011 Study we were told that anti-assignment clauses created 
great problems for online auctions.  However, the 2014 Study revealed that since 
then this part of the industry has developed workarounds similar to those in regular 
invoice discounting, and so what is said in relation to that also applies to online 
auctions. 
49   Although such a breach is unlikely to be repudiatory, it could fall within 
a clause entitling the customer to terminate for “any material breach” (which is quite 
common) or could trigger a cross-default clause.  The absence of a general duty of 
good faith in English law could mean that a customer could rely on such a 
termination clause even if its real motivation for termination was something entirely 
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The financier might worry about two situations: (1) if the supplier 
becomes insolvent, and (2) if the customer does not pay and the 
supplier refuses to enforce.50 
In relation to the first situation, financiers almost universally 
protect themselves by taking a security interest over all assets of the 
supplier.51 This has the effect, under English law, of enabling the 
financier to appoint an administrator of the supplier should it become 
insolvent.52  The financier is then in a good position to direct the 
administrator to collect the receivables and pass the proceeds to it. 
There seems to be little concern among financiers about the collecting 
in of debts if an administrator is appointed (even if not appointed by 
that particular financier), although the costs are sometimes a problem 
if the supplier is a very small business.53 Financiers also see an “all 
assets” security interest as having an additional benefit, namely that it 
will cover receivables that are not assigned to the financier because of 
an anti-assignment clause. Sometimes, financiers specify that such 
“non-vesting debts” fall within a fixed charge, while much of the all 
assets security interest will be a floating charge. However, depending 
on the wording of the clause, to the extent that it prevents a valid 
assignment, an anti-assignment clause may also prevent the creation of 
a valid security interest.54 
                                                 
different. In theory, a breach could entitle a customer to obtain an injunction to 
prevent further breaches (although this is unlikely) or to sue for damages. However, 
it is usually hard to see what loss is suffered. 
50   The 2014 Study indicated that the latter concern is at least as important, 
and, for invoice discounters, more important than the 2011 Study, although the 
sample for this particular question was small. 
51   2011 and 2014 Study, supra note 2. 
52   The Insolvency Act 1986 provides that a qualifying floating charge 
holder can appoint an administrator out of court. The Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, 
sch. B-1, ¶ 14 (U.K.). 
53   Seminar to explore and discuss the merits of an online register for all 
security interests, including outright assignments of receivables, Secured 
Transactions Law Reform Project, May 8, 2014; 2014 Study, supra note 2. 
54   Although a charge is not, in theory, an assignment, many charges are 
drafted as equitable mortgages, which involve an equitable assignment of the 
receivables. A fixed charge has been treated as an assignment in a number of cases. 
See Biggerstaff v. Rowatt’s Wharf Ltd., [1896] 2 EWCH 93 C.A. (U.K.); N W Robbie 
& Co. v. Witney Warehouse Co., [1963] 1 W.L.R. 1324 (C.A.) (U.K.); Foamcrete 
(UK) Ltd. v. Thrust Engineering Ltd., [2000] EWCA (Civ) 351. See also Re Turner 
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Another mode of protection often coupled with the all assets’ 
security interest is for financiers to take a personal guarantee from the 
directors of the supplier company.55 Of course, the effectiveness of 
such guarantee depends on the credit-worthiness of the directors, and 
also may entail costs in enforcing the claims under the guarantees, to 
which there could be arguable defenses. 
Yet another possibility is for the financier to take a power of 
attorney enabling it to sue the customer in the name of the supplier.56 
This protection tends to be more useful in the second situation: when 
the supplier is solvent but refuses to sue. For the power of attorney to 
be irrevocable on the insolvency of the supplier, the financier must 
have some sort of proprietary right in the receivables or must be owed 
the receivables directly.57 Where there is an anti-assignment clause, the 
latter is clearly not the case, and it is unclear whether a right under a 
trust is a sufficient proprietary interest to render the power irrevocable. 
The legal position is uncertain and untested.58 
An anti-assignment clause causes much greater problems for 
financiers who operate on a notification basis. Here, there is a 
likelihood that the customer will refuse to pay the financier when 
notified, and will, instead, pay the supplier.  The financier is then at 
risk of the proceeds being dissipated by the supplier, leaving the 
financier at the credit risk of the supplier. As a result, such financiers 
often refuse to finance receivables arising from contracts containing 
such clauses, or demand that the customer agrees to a waiver.59 The 
evidence from the 2014 study is that financiers only sometimes pursue 
a waiver. There was considerable agreement60 that the time and effort 
                                                 
Corp. Ltd. (In Liq), [1995] 17 ACSR 761 (Austl.) (where the Federal Court of Australia 
took the view that a clause prohibiting assignment also prohibited a charge). 
55   2011 and 2014 Study, supra note 2. 
56   2014 Study, supra note 2. 
57   Powers of Attorney Act, 1971, c. 27, § 4 (Eng.). 
58   See M. BRIDGE, L. GULLIFER, G. MCMEEL & S. WORTHINGTON, THE 
LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 29-43 (2013). 
59   2011 Study, supra note 2. It should be pointed out that invoice 
discounters also sometimes refuse to finance receivables if they contain an anti-
assignment clause, will only finance them on a factoring basis, or will demand a 
waiver.  This is particularly true if, for some reason, a security interest over the 
supplier’s assets is not taken. 
60   Twelve out of the eighteen respondents agreed. 
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involved in obtaining a waiver was substantial or significant, and that 
by no means all customers were willing to agree to a waiver. Some 
customers would only agree to a waiver on terms that were 
disadvantageous to the supplier: this depended on the bargaining 
power between them and also on whether the financing was being 
sought at the beginning of the supplier/customer relationship. 
In one sense, the increasing availability of supply chain 
financing is a workaround.  This is customer driven: the customer 
waives the anti-assignment clause to enable supply chain financing 
with its nominated financier, but relies on the clause to prevent the 
supplier obtaining financing elsewhere. This means that the supplier is 
locked into the supply chain financing deal, which could be seen as 
anti-competitive. The discount rate for such financing is usually 
reasonably low since it is based on the credit rating of the (large) 
customer, but the period for which financing is required may be 
increased.61 Nevertheless, supply chain financing does achieve 
protection for the customer; only invoices approved by the customer 
are financed, which reduces disputes, and the customer does not have 
to deal with a financier with whom it has no relationship. 
It can be seen that the receivables industry has developed a 
number of workarounds which mean that, with the exception of the 
situation where factors cannot or do not try to obtain a waiver, 
receivables containing anti-assignment clauses are actually being 
financed. The workarounds, however, are costly in terms of time and 
effort, and also create more uncertainty, which can lead to costly 
disputes. In fact, one concern of the industry is that the existence of 
an enforceable anti-assignment clause may give a customer traction in 
disputes which it would not otherwise have, or will enable the 
customer to negotiate benefits for itself which would otherwise not 
exist. Although it is hard to prove, it seems likely that the existence of 
enforceable anti-assignment clauses will increase the cost of 
financing.62 
                                                 
61   See above, [text to notes 43 – 45]. 
62   In the 2014 Study, eleven out of eighteen answered “always” or 
“sometimes” to the question: “Do you consider that (a) receivables are purchased at 
a greater discount to face value, or (b) the advance rate applied to the purchase of 
receivables will be reduced, as a result of the possibility that the contract governing 
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IV. INEQUALITY OF BARGAINING POWER 
At this point it is necessary to consider the reasons why a 
customer might want to include an anti-assignment clause in a supply 
contract. The reasons usually given in the literature are that the 
customer wishes to avoid paying the wrong party, that the customer 
wishes to make sure that set-offs can continue to arise between it and 
the supplier, and that the customer wishes to continue to deal with the 
supplier rather than the financier, who is an unknown quantity.63 The 
information gathered from the two surveys (which came from all three 
constituencies: customers, suppliers, and financiers) shows that the 
motivations are more mixed. There appeared to be little concern about 
paying the wrong party per se,64 but there did appear to be genuine 
concern about incorrect invoicing and the sorting out of disputes.65 It 
was thought that financiers would be more concerned that the invoice 
was paid, and would wish disputes to be sorted out afterwards between 
the customer and the supplier. The problem of incorrect invoicing was 
being tackled both by self-invoicing and electronic invoice platforms.66 
However, the desire to retain the relationship with the supplier in order 
to sort out disputes is ongoing.67 Not surprisingly, opinions varied as 
                                                 
the receivable may contain a valid prohibition on assignment than would apply if 
such prohibitions on assignment were not binding as against an assignee?” However, 
only a small minority answered “yes” to the question: “Do you consider that the cost 
of finance is increased as a result of the inclusion of a prohibition on assignment 
within funded ledgers?” This discrepancy may be explained by the latter question 
being interpreted as relating only to where receivables with anti-assignment clauses 
were actually included in the funded ledger, which is seldom the case in factoring 
arrangements. 
63   See, e.g., Orkun Akseli, Contractual Prohibitions on Assignment of 
Receivables: an English and UN perspective, 7 J. BUS. L. 650, 656 (2009); LOUISE 
GULLIFER & JENNIFER PAYNE, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY 378–79 (2011); Roy Goode, Contractual Prohibitions against Assignment, 
LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 300, 302 (2009). 
64   This was only mentioned by the financiers in the 2011 Study, but by 
no one else. 
65   Especially evidence from customers. 2011 Study, supra note 2. 
66   See, e.g., TUNGSTEN, http://www.tungsten-
network.com/uk/en/expertise/e-invoicing/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).  
67   This desire was mentioned by a number of respondents to the 2014 
Study. 
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to how helpful the financiers were in sorting out disputes and how 
aggressively they sought payment. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the issue of set-off did not seem to be of 
great importance to the parties.68 This may reflect the fact that 
transaction set-off, that is, set-off of cross-claims arising out of the 
same contract or closely related to the claim, is not affected by 
assignment of the receivable. The desire to lock the supplier into a 
supply chain finance agreement was mentioned by one respondent to 
the 2014 Study and one respondent to the 2011 Study mentioned one 
customer who wanted total confidentiality and did not want its identity 
revealed to a financier. However, there seemed to be considerable 
consensus that, in many cases, customers did not include anti-
assignment clauses to prevent receivables financing, but rather to 
prevent “assignment” (or sub-contracting) of suppliers’ obligations 
under the contract. Of course, under English law an obligation cannot 
be assigned, and so such a clause would be unnecessary, but it might 
be included out of ignorance or in order to make the sub-contracting 
of obligations a repudiatory breach, which would entitle the customer 
to terminate the relationship. In any event, many financiers felt that 
the clauses, in the form in which they precluded receivables financing, 
were included without a great deal of thought: out of habit or fear of 
the unknown or out of an over-abundance of caution by lawyers who 
drafted the boilerplate contract.69 
It is certainly the case that anti-assignment clauses are generally 
found in standard form contracts used by large companies for their 
small and medium-sized suppliers.70 The suppliers cannot negotiate the 
terms of the contracts and, as previously discussed, may find it difficult 
to obtain a waiver. Where the balance of bargaining power is reversed 
so that the supplier is a large company and the customer is a small 
company or consumer, the latter are not able to bargain for the 
protection of an anti-assignment clause. Control of anti-assignment 
clauses therefore raises the broader question of protection of small 
                                                 
68   This was the view of the customers in the 2011 Study, though one 
supplier thought that it was critical. 
69   2014 Study, supra note 2. 
70   All respondents to the 2014 Study selected either large companies or 
government agencies (or both) as likely to include anti-assignment clauses in their 
contracts, although four also selected small companies.  
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businesses against potentially unfair terms. Under English law, 
unreasonable exclusion and limitation clauses in standard form 
contracts are unenforceable against businesses of all sizes71 and penalty 
clauses are sometimes unenforceable,72 but otherwise any control of 
unfair terms relates to consumer contracts. The Law Commission 
suggested in 200573 that some control should be extended to contracts 
with micro businesses,74 but this suggestion has not been implemented. 
Some of the suppliers who responded to the 2011 Study suggested that 
there was a problem with unfair terms in supply contracts75 which was 
wider than just with anti-assignment clauses, and that either legislation 
or wider codes of practice76 were needed. 
If it is right that inequality of bargaining power enables large 
customers to impose potentially unfair terms on small suppliers, then 
statutory control of anti-assignment clauses could have the effect that, 
deprived of this protection, the customers just imposed more 
swingeing terms in other areas.77 
V. THE ROLE OF ANTI-ASSIGNMENT CLAUSES IN FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 
In many financial transactions, there are specific reasons for 
the inclusion of anti-assignment clauses that are important for the 
proper functioning of the market. In some cases, the clause does not 
ban assignment, but permits it to certain entities and requires consent 
                                                 
71   Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50, §§ 3, 6(3), 7(3) (U.K.).   
72   GUENTER H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 20-129 to 20-145 
(Edwin Peel ed., 14th ed. 2015).  
73   THE LAW COMMISSION AND THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, 
UNFAIR TERMS IN CONTRACTS, 292 (2005).  
74   Micro businesses are defined as businesses with nine or fewer 
employees. 
75   One example is a term making large sums payable on termination of 
the contract by the supplier.   
76   See, e.g., GROCERIES CODE ADJUCIATOR, GROCERIES SUPPLY CODE 
OF PRACTICE, 2009 (U.K.), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/groceries-supply-code-of-practice. 
77   For example, a term that an invoice for goods or services is not payable 
until the invoice has been approved by the customer. This possibility was discussed 
with the respondents to the 2011 Study, but is, of course, speculation because there 
can be no hard evidence. 
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for assignment to others. Thus, for example, in syndicated loan 
agreements, it is very common for the relevant clause to permit 
assignment to certain financial institutions, but require consent for 
assignment to others. This stems from a concern that were the loan to 
be assigned to, for example, a hedge fund specializing in distressed 
debt, it would be enforced in a much more aggressive way than it 
would be by a bank.78 It also stems from a concern that a loan might 
be sold to one of the competitors of the borrower.79 In derivatives 
contracts, which depend on close-out netting to protect against credit 
risk and for enforcement, it is critical that mutuality of parties is 
maintained and so restrictions on assignment are very important. 
The existence of these reasons for anti-assignment (or 
restrictions on assignment) clauses to be enforceable means that any 
statutory override of anti-assignment clauses has to be limited in scope 
to the context in which such clauses cause most problems, namely, 
receivables financing. This, of course, raises definitional issues: for 
example, how do you exclude contracts for financial products without 
also excluding contracts for the provision of services relating to finance 
(such as computing services and financial advice)? The difficulties that 
such definitional issues pose, and the concern about the effects on the 
financial industry for getting the limitation of scope wrong, have led to 
considerable opposition to the statutory control of anti-assignment 
clauses from lawyers operating in the City of London and bankers. 
VI. SHOULD THERE BE A STATUTORY OVERRIDE? 
As I have indicated, the debate in England and Wales has 
moved from a clash of policies to a discussion based on pragmatism 
and cost-benefit analysis. In most situations, the presence of anti-
assignment clauses does not prevent suppliers from financing their 
receivables. This is because the law has developed in such a way that a 
financier will generally have an equitable interest in, at least, the 
proceeds of the receivables and probably in the receivables themselves.   
                                                 
78   The market has therefore developed ways of transferring the risk and 
benefit of the loan without actually assigning it, such as loan participation and, more 
commonly, credit default swaps. 
79   THE LAW COMMISSION NO. 296, COMPANY SECURITY INTERESTS, 
2005, Cm. 6654, at126, (U.K).  
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Further, the industry has developed a number of workarounds, which 
means that the receivables will be collected for the ultimate benefit of 
the financier both where the customer does not pay and when the 
supplier is insolvent. None of this is surprising. In the absence of any 
statutory control of anti-assignment clauses it is to be expected that 
both the law and the industry will accommodate the interests of all 
parties to the extent that it can. 
This, however, is not the end of the story. If the current 
position imposes costs on the industry, and thus on financing, which 
are not outweighed by the benefit of such clauses to the customers, 
then this would be a good reason for legislation. A further reason could 
be if certain suppliers were unable to obtain financing. Moreover, if it 
were felt that legislation could do little or no harm, but would have the 
beneficial effect of clarifying the existing law and making the balance 
of protection between all parties clear, this could also justify legislative 
change. All three of these arguments pertain in England and Wales 
today. 
It is reasonably clear from both surveys80 that some small 
suppliers, whom financiers will not finance on the basis of invoice 
discounting because of concerns about their ability to collect in the 
receivables and hold them on trust for the financier, are unable to have 
certain invoices financed because they contain anti-assignment clauses. 
The only way round this problem is for the customer to waive the 
clause, and this is only possible on some occasions. Often it will not 
be possible, either because the costs of waiving outweigh the benefits 
to both the supplier and the financier, or because the supplier has little 
bargaining power compared to the customer. The U.K. Government 
is very concerned about the funding of small businesses at the 
moment: they are seen as critical to economic recovery.81 The effect 
on small businesses, then, is a good reason for a statutory override of 
anti-assignment clauses. 
                                                 
80   It should be born in mind that both surveys were fairly small-scale. 
81   Small Business, Big Support Confirmed by Prime Minister, GOV.UK (Jan. 27, 
2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/small-business-big-support-
confirmed-by-prime-minister. 
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It is also clear that the presence of such clauses leads to costs 
for the financing industry. While it should not be overemphasized,82 
there is the cost of discovering such clauses. Waivers can also be costly, 
as is the development and execution of the workarounds discussed 
above. Moreover, the existence of the workarounds themselves 
increases ex ante uncertainty, both in terms of the law83 and also in that 
it increases the possibility of disputes. Finally, the law itself is complex 
and uncertain. A financier cannot be sure that it has a valid interest in 
a receivable containing an anti-assignment clause. It is clearer that it 
has an equitable interest in the proceeds, but this is not any good if the 
proceeds are not traceable. 
Are these costs outweighed by the benefits of the clauses? It is 
clear that such clauses are of value in the context of financial contracts. 
However, some of the reasons why customers seem to include them 
in their contracts are of little or no merit,84 and the results from the 
(small-scale) surveys suggest that some do not seem of concern in the 
real world.85 The concern about preserving a relationship with the 
supplier in the event of dispute or incorrect invoices is a real one. Yet, 
the latter concern can be overcome with modern invoicing techniques, 
and the former argument is undermined by the fact that customers are 
prepared to permit assignment to a financier of their choice under a 
supply chain finance scheme. The argument that a financier might be 
more aggressive than a supplier in enforcing invoices is also flawed, 
since the risk of a third party influencing enforcement is an ever 
present one: the supplier could be taken over by more aggressive 
management. The customer’s concern to remain in a relationship with 
the supplier may have more to do with the fact that the supplier is a 
small business compared to the customer, and therefore the customer 
is more likely to have the upper hand in negotiations than it would with 
                                                 
82   This is because financiers are familiar with the standard terms of the 
big customers, and also because they would read the contracts anyway for other 
adverse clauses. 
83   For example, whether a power of attorney will be enforceable on 
insolvency of the supplier, or whether an anti-assignment clause renders a charge 
void. 
84   The prevention of sub-contracting does not require an anti-assignment 
clause, and the “habit” or “fear of the unknown” reasons seem unmeritorious. 
85   There seems to be little concern about set-off, or about the danger of 
paying the wrong party. 
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a financier. The use of an anti-assignment clause to lock a supplier into 
supply chain financing also seems unmeritorious. If the supply chain 
financing was sufficiently attractive to the supplier, it would choose it 
over other sources of financing. 
This brings us to the argument that a statutory override would 
do little harm, and could do some good in clarifying the law. One 
possible harm, however, is that the override is not sufficiently limited 
and might cause problems in the financial markets. This is a serious 
risk, but could be overcome by careful drafting, even if this were at the 
expense of not including some borderline cases within the override. 
Another possibility is that an override may lead to harsher terms being 
imposed by large customers on small suppliers in other areas. This 
again would be serious, but could be controlled by a code of practice.86 
It therefore seems that the benefit in clarifying the law would outweigh 
any possible detriment. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to elucidate the arguments both for and 
against a statutory override of anti-assignment clauses in English law. 
It is suggested that the arguments are not ones of principle, or even 
policy, but are more pragmatic. Since such clauses have not ever been 
the subject of statutory intervention, the common law has developed 
in such a way as to give all parties limited protection, and the industry 
has worked around the law to enable receivables financing to take 
place. However, on the basis of two recent surveys, the pragmatic 
arguments are assessed, and it appears that a statutory override would 
be beneficial. 
 
 
                                                 
86   See, e.g., GROCERIES CODE ADJUCIATOR, GROCERIES SUPPLY CODE 
OF PRACTICE, 2009 (U.K.), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/groceries-supply-code-of-practice.  
